Honesty and Candour in Mediation: Are They in Short Supply?

Mediation, like negotiation, is at its most basic a process of communication between parties in dispute. The aim in mediation is to find a mutually agreeable solution. The success of mediation might well depend on the ‘honesty’ and ‘candour’ of the parties and their representatives. The parties must be honest and open enough to find a zone of agreement.

The terms honesty and candour need to be defined. Elsewhere I have defined ‘honesty’ as a concept which concerns the accuracy of information conveyed, while ‘candour’ is a concept which goes to the heart of whether or not information is conveyed at all.

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Honesty the flower: credit Creative Commons  see below

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While it makes sense for the parties to be honest and open enough to find a mutually acceptable solution, only a fool would rush into a mediation and reveal, at the outset, their BATNAs, WATNAs, and bottom lines.

As for mediators, they are constantly handling information gleaned from the parties in dispute. Often they have to run ‘messages’ back and forth from separate sessions with the parties.

This short discussion looks at the obligations, if any, which fall upon the mediation participants and mediators to be honest and candid.

Parties and their representatives – duties owed to mediators and to each other

Agreements/Legislation

Standard form agreements to mediate and relevant legislation do not usually impose an obligation to be honest and/or candid, although they often require parties to ‘cooperate’ with each other and with the mediator to carry out tasks such as isolation of issues in dispute, exploration of options and so on. Many legislative schemes require the parties to participate in good faith. The terms ‘cooperation’ and ‘good faith’ (and ‘genuine effort’) are rarely defined in agreements to mediate or by relevant legislation but the courts have discerned some common elements (eg attendance at the mediation by someone with authority to settle). Some guidance on behaviour which is not inconsistent with good faith in mediation is also available from cases and commentaries. Good faith does not require a party to act against self-interest and it does not require a party to take ‘any step to advance the interests of the other party’.[1] Good faith does not require the parties to engage in total disclosure. There is no requirement to reveal all of one’s negotiation goals and bottom lines.

Lawyers, as agents for their clients, are also bound by the obligation to act in good faith. A lawyer cannot mislead the mediator or his or her opponent about a material fact for it is recognised that such action (or inaction, where a false statement needs to be corrected) constitutes bad faith.

Negotiation Convention

It is sometimes assumed that interest-based negotiation, which underlies the facilitative model of mediation, requires honesty and candour. Negotiators adhering to an interest-based approach might explain their positions and interests (and refrain from misleading on these matters) with the idea of finding a solution that meets each parties’ interests, but the prescription to be honest and forthcoming with information stops at positions and interests. There is no requirement under this model of negotiation to disclose one’s BATNA or bottom lines.

Rules of Professional Conduct for Lawyers

If the parties are legally represented, the level of regulation intensifies. Legal representatives are subject to the ‘law of lawyering’ including the rules of conduct of the legal profession. These rules set out obligations owed by lawyers to courts and tribunals, clients, opponents and other parties.

Lawyers cannot mislead or deceive the court on any matter. They must advise the court of any adverse legal authorities and legislation. They must be honest and courteous to clients. They must not mislead or deceive their opponents. They must treat everyone with whom they interact, with honesty and courtesy.

Aside from the requirement to advise the court about adverse legal authorities and legislation, the rules do not impose a positive obligation to reveal information unless it is necessary to correct a half-truth or to correct a prior statement which has since become false.

The rules in relation to clients, opponents and others are easily transferable to mediation. The rules in relation to courts are an awkward fit in mediation. It seems that practitioners must treat mediators as courts (see the definition of ‘court’ in the professional conduct rules). If this is the case, practitioners must never mislead or deceive a mediator and they must reveal adverse legal authorities and legislation. I say that this is an awkward fit because mediators do not make substantive decisions and, unless he or she is an evaluative mediator, a mediator seems to have no need for information on adverse authorities and legislation. What is clear is that practitioners do not have to reveal other information either to the mediator or to an opponent save if it is necessary to correct a half truth or correct a statement which has become false (and of course, the practitioner must not reveal information without the consent of the client).

Mediators – duties owed to participants

The NMAS Standards

Assuming that a mediator is accredited under the NMAS and ‘bound’ by the scheme’s Practice Standards (PS), the mediator owes a duty of honesty in regard to matters of advertising and promotion of mediation. But that may be the extent of the mediator’s obligation for honesty under the PS. The mediator might owe an obligation to act with ‘integrity’ but the meaning of that term is not clear.

Rules of Professional Conduct for Lawyers

If the mediator is a lawyer, he or she is still subject to the law of lawyering.

Lawyer mediators owe obligations to the court (not to mislead or deceive). A lawyer mediator is still a lawyer and could not, for example, be a party to a fraud committed during mediation.

The rules governing the relationship of lawyers and opponents seems to have no application to mediators. Mediation participants are not the mediator’s opponents.

Mediation participants are not clients in the traditional sense.

It may be that participants are best considered to be ‘others’ (they are certainly not courts). If this assumption is correct, mediators are obliged to treat mediation participants with honesty and courtesy but there is, at least under the legal profession’s rules, no requirement for candour.

What is the safest course?

The best advice for parties (and their legal representatives) is to reveal information slowly and cautiously. If information is conveyed, care must be taken to ensure that it is accurate. Lawyer mediators must also take care to ensure that any information they convey is accurate. Since there is no general duty of candour, all those who participate in mediation – including mediators – must think before they talk. At times, they may want to take refuge in a silent ‘safe harbour’.

 

[1] United Group Rail Services Limited v Rail Corporation New South Wales [2009] NSWCA 177 (3 July 2009) [76] (Allsop P).

Collaborative Practice – unique skillset or traditional lawyering?

 

Student Guest Post by Ben Zocco

 

This post is the first in a series of posts on this blog written by students studying Non-Adversarial Justice at the Faculty of Law at Monash University. Students were invited to write blog posts explaining various complex areas of law relating to dispute resolution to ordinary readers. The very best posts are published here.

 

 

The advent of collaborative practice as a means of resolving family law disputes has provided couples with a means of completing a divorce or separation in a conciliatory and cost effective manner. With more than 200 practitioners currently registered with the Law Institute of Victoria’s Collaborative Law Section, a significant number of lawyers have undergone training that allows them to practice collaboratively.

 

The Law Council of Australia’s Basic Training Requirements

In response to its increasing popularity of collaborative practice, the Law Council of Australia has published the Australian Collaborative Practice Guidelines for Lawyers. This document encompasses a series of “Basic Training” requirements in order to be recognised as being collaboratively trained. This set of overarching training requirements forms a best practice guide for ensuring practitioners engaging in collaborative law are appropriately prepared for acting in this unique practice area.

army-recruit-is-in-training-at-the-army-physical-training-school-brisbane-1942Image: Courtesy State Library of Queensland

 

The Basic Training requirements provide for the teaching of a range of skills that are unique to the practice of collaborative law. This is particularly so with the requirement that practitioners are provided with relevant training of the “collaborative model”.

 

What is Collaborative Practice?

Collaborative practice, as the name suggests, is a non-adversarial process used to resolve disputes. It requires the parties and their legal representatives to enter into a formal contract that puts the focus of the process settling a matter rather than resorting to litigation. Terms in the agreement generally refer to a commitment for each party to engage in the collaborative process in good faith and to share all available relevant information pertaining to the dispute with the other party. If the dispute is not resolved and parties seek to formally commence legal proceedings, the lawyers engaged in the collaborative process are contractually required to cease representing their clients. This requires the parties to engage new lawyers, generally at a significant cost, and serves as a major incentive to the parties to find common ground and work collaboratively to resolve their dispute.

Collaborative practice is conducted in the presence of each party and their legal adviser in what is described as a “four way meeting”. Several four way meetings take place over the course of a number of months, with each run according to agenda devised by the parties in consultation with their lawyers prior to the meeting. The conclusion of the four way meetings seeks to culminate in the drafting and execution of an agreement that resolves the dispute in a manner that is mutually acceptable to both parties.

 

The Unique Nature of Collaborative Practice

The collaborative model, as describe above, is an entirely unique approach to the resolution of disputes. While traditional mediation is also seen as an alternative to litigating matters, it differs from collaborative practice in many respects. The absence of a mediator in collaborative practice requires the legal representatives to facilitate the discussion rather than simply representing their client. Additionally, the capabilities necessary to operate collaboratively in the absence of a court-mandated framework for discovery and good faith negotiation is at odds with that of conventional alternative dispute resolution approaches. Accordingly, this skillset is unique to collaborative law practitioners.

The skills required of collaborative practitioners are also unique insofar as the model makes use of independent experts to facilitate the settlement of disputes. It is standard practice in a matter being resolved collaboratively to utilise the expertise of third party professionals, especially those who are trained as child specialists or financial advisors. These experts assist the parties and the lawyers in exploring interests (rather than positions) and potential options to satisfy the needs of the parties. Additionally, their experience assists the couple in being able to understand the impact of their separation on their children, as well as its effect on the financial position of each person once the dispute has finalised.

While the interaction of legal practitioners and independent experts is extremely common, the manner in which they work together in a collaborative setting compared with that of general legal practice is significantly different. In many jurisdictions, the relationship between independent expert is governed by a formal practice note, issued by the court. Lawyers typically engage independent experts by way of a formal retainer, setting out the advice necessary for the purposes of the matter. The expert will then write a formal report, setting out their findings. In many cases, an expert will be required to “hot tub” with an expert appointed by the opposing party in order to reach consensus conclusions and to narrow the issues in dispute. Additionally, experts retained in a litigation matter are subject to rigorous cross examination from other parties, adding an adversarial flavour to their contribution made for the purposes of resolving the matter.

In contrast, a collaborative approach requires each party to jointly appoint an expert, often by way of a shared recommendation by the practitioners representing them. The expert will work with each party in the room together and will rarely engage in separate discussions with parties individually. Rather than the lawyers approaching the assistance of an expert’s contribution as potentially suspect or misconstrued as may be the case in litigated disputes, they are able to respect and value their support in a truly collaborative fashion. Accordingly, the interdisciplinary approach to collaborative practice means a collaborative practitioner is required to have a unique skillset when involving experts in a matter being managed collaboratively.

 

Negotiation for All, Not Just the Collaborative

While there are many aspects of the “Basic Training” requirements that are unique to collaborative practitioners, it is clear that are not all exclusively within the domain of collaborative law.

A crucial example of this is the necessity that collaborative practitioners must be aware of and trained in negotiation theory; specifically, that of the differences between interest and positional-based bargaining.

A key tool in the arsenal of a collaborative practitioner is assisting the parties to consider the distinction between positions and interests. Unlike traditional positional bargaining, focusing on interests allows the parties to concentrate on the key issues that require resolution, rather than the parties becoming distracted on minor matters, falling into positional impasses or creating acrimony in the process. This prioritisation of interests, rather than positions, also assists the parties in being able to develop creative solutions that are mutually amenable, rather than being focused on finding a middle ground between two respective positions, neither of which may be the best holistic outcome.

But similar strategies are used in some forms of mediation generally, rather than solely within a collaborative setting. Facilitative mediation, for instance, also focuses on steering the parties toward concentrating on positions rather than interests. This occurs in a traditional mediation setting, involving the parties, their legal representatives and a trained mediator. Additionally, several popular negotiation courses offered by institutions such as MIT and Harvard University train legal practitioners and business executives to be aware of the distinction when being involved in a negotiation.

Accordingly, negotiation theory should not be considered solely a skill that is relevant to collaborative practitioners, but to the legal profession generally. Despite the differences in approach to alternative dispute resolution, ensuring that the legal profession is adequately trained to delineate between a client’s needs and wants should be recognised in considering the skills that are desirable for all practitioners to hold.

It is clear that collaborative practitioners are required to be appropriately trained in their interaction with fellow lawyers in a collaborative setting, the collaborative model in general and the manner in which the interdisciplinary focus of the practice differs from the general use of experts in a dispute. These are skillsets that, currently, are largely unique and confined to the practice of collaborative law. It is essential for the continued success of collaborative practice within Australia for the distinction between these attributes to other forms of alternative dispute resolution to be clear.

However, it can also be said that collaborative law requires skills that are not solely used within its discipline. A knowledge of negotiation theory is highly desirable for legal practitioners to possess for everyday dispute resolution, not just that involving collaborative practice. To that extent, it is clear that the collaborative practice “Basic Training” requirements of the Law Council of Australia encompass training that is both unique to collaborative practitioners and also relevant to the legal profession generally.

 

Mr Ben Zocco has recently completed Bachelor of Arts and Bachelor of Laws degrees from Monash University and will be commencing as a graduate lawyer with a national law firm in 2017. He has spent the later years of his legal education studying various forms of alternative dispute resolution and looks forward to the opportunity to put this knowledge into practice as a lawyer.

 

 

John Lande discussing Litigation as Violence

John Lande has posted a very thought provoking piece on his blog ‘Indisputably’, discussing a journal article by Professor Vincent Cardi from West Virginia University.   The article is entitled “Litigation as Violence”

Lande in his post brings in many of the themes that preoccupy those of us at the ADR Research network –  the importance of empirical research around litigation and dispute resolution, as well as themes of legal education in dispute resolution, litigant stress, and impact on the wellbeing of the legal profession.

Both the post and the article are well worth reading for legal educators, ADR practitioners and lawyers alike.

ADR and the Importance of Data

A recent post by Dr Becky Batagol had me thinking about the importance of good data collection in the field of ADR.  ADR proponents make many claims about the benefits of ADR.  We also know that most dispute resolution processes occur behind closed doors, which challenges our ability to make sweeping statements about “what goes on” in ADR processes.  Good data, collected from third party facilitators, disputing parties and non participant observers, helps us to make strong claims about the efficacy of ADR forums.

Such data may help us to more clearly consider questions that we believe we already know the answer to.  Do ADR processes really preserve relationships when compared to litigation?  Are the values of self-determination and autonomy actively promoted in ADR?  Do parties focus more on their interests, rather than their positions in ADR?  Are remedies achieved in ADR more flexible and varied, compared to court adjudication?

ADR researchers also need to consider methodological approaches that allow us to say things like:

  • ADR is cheaper than litigation.
    ADR is quicker than litigation.
    Settlement rates in ADR are high (compared to what?)
    Party satisfaction with ADR processes is high.

When I think about these claims, I think about the (initial) words of Thomas Jefferson and the American Declaration of Independence… “We hold these truths to be sacred and undeniable”.  I think good data allows us to cast sunlight on many of ADR’s claims.  It is important that we do shine light on these claims, so that users and providers of ADR services understand what ADR can and cannot sensibly lay claim to.  Becky made reference in her earlier post to data that would be useful to have:

  • settlement rates
    factors that may influence settlement rates, such as referral stage
    what happens when disputes are not settled at ADR
    participant satisfaction with ADR and perceptions of fairness, the time and costs expended by participants and service providers.

For members of the ADR research network and readers of this blog – what other data do you think we should be trying to collect??

James

Wishin’ and Hopin’: ADR Policy in Victoria

The past couple of years have seen dispute resolution increasingly politicised in Australia, as we have explained elsewhere. The Victorian election, held on 29 November this year and which resulted in a change of government, is no exception.

The new Australian Labor Party (ALP) government has made an explicit commitment to increasing use of ADR in Victoria. The government’s pre-election platform states (at p 67-8):

 Where disputes occur, Government should provide Victorians with options to resolve them at the earliest stage to avoid the cost, stress and delay that is often a feature of traditional court proceedings.

Specific policies promised in relation to ADR include increased promotion of mediation and ramping up the dispute resolution options at VCAT, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, so that it is restored as “a simple, low cost jurisdiction that assists parties seeking speedy resolution of their matters in a less formal and intimidating environment.”

The government has also committed in its platform to providing increased access to justice for vulnerable Victorians (p.67). It has promised an inquiry into access to justice in Victoria including into availability and funding of Community Legal Centres (CLCs). Specific measures pledged to improve access to justice include increased funding for Victoria Legal Aid, addressing “the clogging of the court system”, fixing the problems with funding cuts at VCAT and encouraging more lawyers to work at Community Legal Centres through providing incentives such as scholarships and HECS rebates.

Related promises in the ALP platform include mainstreaming into the broader court system some of the successes of the problem-oriented courts set up in Victoria over the past decade (p.64) so that offenders are better connected to the services they need to address their offending.

While the previous government was in power Victoria from 2010-14, ADR policy moved slowly at best. The Attorney-General for that government, Robert Clark, had publicly expressed his commitment to ADR, stating to the LEADR Kongress in September last year: “The State government is a strong supporter of ADR and the role it can play in bringing about just outcomes in a timely and cost-effective manner.” However the record of the coalition government supporting ADR did not match these words when, in 2011, it repealed legislation containing broad-scale pre-action procedures mandating participation in ADR for all civil disputes before the courts. In passing these reforms, the Attorney-General stated in Hansard on 10 Feb 2011 (at p 307):

It is common sense and good practice for parties to attempt to resolve their dispute without resorting to litigation if there is a reasonable prospect of success in such an attempt. However, the government’s view, and the view of many practitioners, is that to seek to compel parties to do so through these heavy-handed provisions will simply add to the complexity, expense and delay of bringing legal proceedings, because of the need to comply with these mandatory requirements, whether or not they are likely to be useful in any particular case.

It is regrettable that the legislation was repealed without any evidence base of the effectiveness of the reforms or independent testing of the Attorney’s claims.

It remains to be seen whether the deeds of this new Victorian government match its words. The fact that ADR and access to justice were explicitly part of the policy platform prior to the election is promising. The new Attorney-General, Martin Pakula, has big shoes to fill, his Labor predecessor being Australia’s most reformist AG, Rob Hulls (Lionel Murphy having fewer years in the job).

While we wait to know more from the government in Victoria, here’s my personal wish-list for the Attorney-General to tackle in relation to dispute resolution/ ADR policy reform in Victoria

  1. A public review of the quality and effectiveness of ADR processes in Victoria. ADR is offered in every Victorian court and by many other state providers. But we know little about the quality of services offered (including settlement rates, satisfaction, inter-professional collaboration around the process and the fairness of outcomes). The Productivity Commission  recently called for all State and Territory governments to conduct an independent public review of the effectiveness and efficiency of dispute resolution mechanisms within their jurisdiction every 5 years, starting by 30 June 2016 (p.298). Such a review would be a good start for a government intent on making an impact where there is already significant state outlay on ADR services and efficient justice investment is an imperative.
  2. Mandating public reporting on standard ADR data by all Victorian ADR service providers (including courts and tribunals, Community Legal Centres, Victoria Legal Aid and other dispute resolution services such as the Dispute Settlement Centre of Victoria, or DSCV). Higher quality and consistent data collection would enable us to understand whether existing ADR services meet their aims and whether gaps in service provision exist. Higher quality data means that money can be efficiently allocated where there is highest need. The public availability of such data is crucial to ensure transparency in provision of dispute resolution services when ADR lacks the many of the fairness protections available in the public court system. The absence of adequate dispute resolution data was noted by the Victorian Law Reform Commission (VLRC) in its 2008 report on Victoria’s civil justice system in relation to the effectiveness of court-ordered mediation in Victoria (at pp 278-83). In 2009, when the Victorian Parliament’s Law Reform Committee recommended that

    At a minimum, the Committee believes that there is a need for consistent data collection across ADR service providers about:

    -settlement rates

    -factors that may influence settlement rates, such as referral stage

    -what happens when disputes are not settled at ADR

    -participant satisfaction with ADR and perceptions of fairness the time and costs expended by participants and service providers. (pp. 58–59)

  3. Widespread use of family group conferences for child protection matters usually commenced in the Children’s Court of Victoria. In 2010, just prior to the State election in that year, the Victorian Law Reform Commission set out a range of options for reform of the processes followed in child protection cases in the Children’s Court of Victoria. One of the options canvassed involved a graduated range of supported, structured
    and child-centred agreement-making processes as the principal means of determining child protection application outcomes instead of existing court processes. The Commission noted that most agreements in child protection matters are already the result of informal bargaining between the parties’ lawyers (at para 7.4) and that supported and child-centered processes such as family group conferences would better enable agreements that are in the best interests of the children involved and which stick in the longer term. These options for reform were never implemented following the 2010 election and may yet help to ensure that scarce resources already invested in Victoria’s child protection system are directed towards assisting vulnerable children have care arrangements that meet their best interests.
  4. Better connecting and integrating state-funded family violence and police services with federally-funded Family Dispute Resolution (FDR) services so as to better protect those experiencing family violence. In 2010 the Australian and NSW Law Reform Commissions’ joint inquiry into family violence concluded that there was potential for FDR to expeditiously and effectively resolve parenting disputes in cases involving family violence but that there had to be better coordination with State and Territory child protection and family violence systems (at paras 21.12-21.13 and 21.50). The Luke Batty case has clearly demonstrated the need for more effective coordination of state-based family violence and police services and services within the federal family law system. The Victorian government has committed to holding a royal commission into family violence. By committing to work specifically with FDR providers including Family Relationship Centres and Victoria Legal Aid’s Roundtable Dispute Resolution, the Victorian government can help to provide avenues for seamless, safe and supported decision-making following family breakdown for women and children experiencing family violence.

So, that’s my list. What is on your personal wish-list for ADR policy reform in your State or locality?

Becky Batagol would like to disclose that she worked for the Victorian Law Reform Commission on its inquiry into Protection Applications in the Children’s Court of Victoria in 2010.

Australia, all the way with ADR. Or are we?

I have been putting the finishing touches on my chapters for the second edition of our book Non-Adversarial Justice, to be published by Federation Press in the middle of this year. The book is co-written with Monash and former Monash law colleagues Michael King (now a Magistrate in WA), Arie Freiberg and Ross Hyams. The book brings together a collection of ideas and practices from disparate areas of the criminal and civil justice system that share some common responses to the adversarial nature of our legal system. We describe these processes as ‘non-adversarial justice’ which we acknowledge is a vague and probably overly negative term, but we have stuck with it because we haven’t been able to come up with anything better. The book explains our views on these commonalities and provides a chapter on the key aspects and ideas of each ‘non-adversarial’ practice or process, including therapeutic jurisprudence, ADR, restorative justice, preventive law, holistic law and creative problem-solving. The are also chapters which situate these ideas in various fields of practice and chapters which thematically draw together new ways of thinking on lawyers, courts and legal education. The book focuses on Australia with reference to international developments.

The first edition book came out in 2009.  In this new edition, we look back over the past 5 years of innovative Australian justice policy and conclude that:

“Because non-adversarialism is new and contentious it is also politically sensitive. Governments that regard this form of justice as being “soft” on crime, ineffective, “heavy-handed”, and expensive have abolished courts, schemes and programs while others recognise their value and have introduced procedural reforms, increased the number of courts and expanded their jurisdiction to cover new areas of harms or problems.”

I have been updating the chapters on family law processes and on ADR. Once of the things I enjoy about writing this book is how each chapter gives me a near-perfect helicopter-view of the terrain of that area.  In relation to ADR policy, there has been a noticeable cooling in government attitudes towards ADR processes within our broader civil justice system in the past half-decade. In particular, I have observed a drawing back from widespread implementation of ADR requirements in the justice system. This is evidenced by the repeal of pre-action legislation in both Victoria and NSW in 2011 and 2013 and, also in 2013, the dissolution of the 18-year-old National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council (or NADRAC), the independent body established to advise the federal Attorney-General on policy issues relating to ADR. In our book we summarise the Australian ambivalence towards ADR in the following way:

“These changes illustrate how the place of ADR and other non-adversarial processes in the justice system is contingent upon the support and patronage of government. Real resistance to non-adversarial practices remains and can make even established non-adversarial processes the subject of political contention. “

 Pre-action procedures, originally developed in England and Wales in the late 1990s, encourage early settlement of disputes, full disclosure of information between the parties and, where the matter cannot be resolved, the narrowing of the issues in dispute, all before proceedings have commenced. Effectively, they cement the place of ADR in the ordinary civil litigation process. Pre-action procedures have been introduced into three Australian jurisdictions since 2009, making this area the most dynamic in the already active field of ADR. However, the legislation introducing pre-action procedures has already been repealed in two of these jurisdictions (Victoria and NSW), revealing the significant unease that exists around the presence of ADR in the contemporary civil justice system in Australia, particularly where lawyers and the parties they represent are mandated to use ADR processes outside specialist jurisdictions. Only at Commonwealth level do pre-action procedures remain a at broad-scale level in Australia, known as “genuine steps” statements, which must be filed prior to litigating in the Federal Court of Australia and the general lists of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia under the Civil Dispute Resolution Act 2011 (Cth). So far, the federal government has indicated no public interest in changing these laws.

In England and Wales, where there are more than 12 -pre-action protocols covering particular areas of civil law, a recent review of rules and principles governing the costs of civil litigation found that the decade-old pre-action protocols system generally worked well, with a few tweeks necessary here and there. However it was recommended that one protocol that covered all areas of civil practical not governed by a specific protocol be repealed. Lord Justice Jackson, author of the review, argued that pre-action protocols work best when tailored to specific areas of practice rather than adopting a “one-size-fits-all” approach to civil litigation generally.  

The English and Welsh experience of pre-action protocols shows that they can change litigation cultures and encourage more settlement (although ADR processes themselves may not be used). For Australia, the implications are that we may be better placed to develop pre-action procedures tailored to the peculiar litigation dynamics of specific areas of civil practice rather than broad-scale requirements as currently legislated in the Civil Dispute Resolution Act 2011 (Cth). Indeed in Australia, some specialist jurisdictions have for some time successfully required participation in ADR before court proceedings can be instituted for certain personal injury claims in Queensland, for farm debts in NSWfor NSW retail tenancy disputes, and in family law disputes since 2004. Failure to comply with these requirements opens a party up to an adverse costs order.

The recent skittishness around ADR policy in Australia can be connected to new governments coming to power and signalling that a new sheriff is in town. These governments, in Victoria, NSW and at federal level, have not benefited from years of high level bureaucratic advice on justice policy, may not share the commitment to ADR and may prefer to appeal to more conservative elements of the legal profession who see innovative dispute resolution policy as a challenge to the profession itself. The legal profession is inherently conservative and is slow to embrace widespread change. For so long, litigation, alongside negotiation associated with litigation practice, have been the way that lawyers have furthered their client’s interests. Compelling parties to use ADR processes such as mediation is a step too far in the eyes of many, as Victorian Attorney-General Robert Clark explained in the 2011 second reading speech for the Civil Procedure and Legal Profession Amendment Act 2011 (Vic)

“It is common sense and good practice for parties to attempt to resolve their dispute without resorting to litigation if there is a reasonable prospect of success in such an attempt. However, the government’s view, and the view of many practitioners, is that to seek to compel parties to do so through these heavy-handed provisions will simply add to the complexity, expense and delay of bringing legal proceedings, because of the need to comply with these mandatory requirements, whether or not they are likely to be useful in any particular case.”  (Parliament of Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 10 February 2011, Victorian Government Printer, Melbourne,  p.307).

My own view is that governments across the Australian jurisdictions should be putting effort (and a great deal of effort, too) into ensuring that ADR processes that are provided are of high quality and have robust protections built in for the disadvantaged and vulnerable, acknowledging that not all cases should settle, although many can, so that court processes are still necessary and towards finding the right balance between legal and non-legal service provision for civil disputes. Getting these issues rights asks us to face the tough questions head-on and address the real tensions behind the ideal of access to justice in a constrained financial context. But this is the space we need to be in for us as a nation to develop the next frontier of justice policy. Whole-scale abolition of schemes designed to increase settlements as occurred in NSW and Victoria and dissolution of high-quality advisory bodies such as NADRAC takes us further away from where we need to be. These decisions have taken us backwards.

What do we all have to do to move forward on this important social issue?

ADR in Legal Education

Many of us advocate the inclusion of ADR as a mandatory course in the legal curriculum both in Australia and internationally.

 

The current crisis in the United States legal education context makes me reflect on the fact that as students ask more of legal educators and their programs it is more important than ever that theory/skills course such as ADR are included in the curriculum.

 

ADR can prepare students for legal practice but also for careers that are not in the law but in associated areas.  ADR is a course that opens up possibilities.

 

For a discussion of the crisis in United States legal education see

The current crisis in American legal education